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I
INTRODUCTION
We frequently assume that a state of affairs as we find or experience it-
whether that state of affairs be cultural, institutional, or personal-both is,
and should be, the norm. This "objectivization" arguably functions to
facilitate acceptance of our environment, but it also makes critical assessment
difficult and change often beyond contemplation. To what degree does this
egocentric phenomenon operate in law, and more specifically among legal
scholars? It might be thought to operate little, for legal scholars seem
constantly to be engaged in an inquiry into what the law should be. But even
those who participate in that inquiry frequently start with fundamental
assumptions about the status of law that go unchallenged as other policy
issues are confronted. And if the assumption relates to the supposed form of
the law, as opposed to its content, there seems to be a lesser tendency to
recognize and correct anomaly. The stranger to our legal system does not
share this perceptual problem, as he has not yet adapted to this legal
environment in which we write and teach.
One such anomaly that the stranger to our universe of American
commercial law would immediately recognize-but that we seem not to
recognize or at least acknowledge publicly any more-is the continued
existence of and interplay between two separate bodies of law that integrally
relate to each other: the Bankruptcy Code,' as the present embodiment of
federal bankruptcy law, and article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,2 as
the present embodiment of personal property security law. That interplay
assumes a particularly curious mode because of the differing authority to be
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accorded to each body of law-one as federal statutory law and the other as
state statutory law.
In itself, the Uniform Commercial Code is a heroic attempt, not always
successful, to secure the sameness of law for commercial transactions
throughout the United States through the process of having over fifty
legislatures independently enact the same legislation. This effort to produce
sameness through attempted state uniformity has historical roots in late
nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century constitutional interpretation
that the federal government's power did not extend to commercial
transactions that, viewed in isolation, took place wholly within a single state.3
But though this constitutional interpretation was repudiated half a century
ago, we still accept as normal a concomitant legislative posture that confronts
basic policy issues relating to personal property security interests and their
validity only awkwardly and with difficulty.
Hence, this article argues that the law of personal property security
interests should be federalized and integrated with the Bankruptcy Code.
The first part of the article tells why a federal approach to sameness of
personal property security law makes more sense than a uniform state
approach. The second part discusses the advantages of integrating that body
of law with the Bankruptcy Code.
II
A FEDERAL VERSUS A UNIFORM STATE APPROACH
Before we explore those considerations that are currently material to
preferring either a federal or a uniform state approach to personal property
security law, it will be useful to elucidate two historical background factors.
The first is that while the suggestion to federalize this aspect of commercial
law is novel, the importance of federalizing certain other aspects of
commercial law has been recognized and, indeed, federalization has been
attempted.4 The second is the state of constitutional jurisprudence at the end
of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century, which cast
commercial law as more appropriately the subject of uniform state rather than
federal legislation.
The most prominent of past federalization attempts, of course, was the
1842 opinion of Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson. 5 Justice Story signally
succeeded. For almost a hundred years thereafter, the rule of this case, as the
common law, was applied by federal courts to commercial disputes, even
when suit was brought on diversity grounds. 6 About fifty years later, in 1890,
3. See infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
4. For an exposition of efforts early in our national history, see generally 1, 2 W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953).
5. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
6. It is interesting to note that this federalization of much of the law relating to commerce
accorded with views expressed even at the beginning of the nineteenth century. For example, James
Sullivan, the governor of Massachusetts, wrote in favor of such a development in 1801. See J.
SULLIVAN, HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 353-54 (1801); 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 4,
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a bill was introduced in Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to
codify the law concerning commercial paper. 7
Interestingly, one of the most vocal proponents of federalization in
twentieth-century America was Professor Karl Llewellyn, at least several years
before he became the chief reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code.8
Almost fifty years ago, a federal sales act that would apply to interstate and
foreign sales transactions was proposed,9 and Professor Llewellyn emerged as
one of its most vigorous drumbeaters.' 0 He supported this legislation not
only to achieve uniformity, but also, in truth, "to clarify the major ambiguities
in the application of the Uniform Sales Act to more recent conditions""l I and
"to correct any important errors of theory or of practical measure which are
shown by thirty-four years of experience to have crept into the Uniform Sales
Act."' 12 In short, one of Professor Llewellyn's first legislative attempts to
correct the perceived shortcomings of the Uniform Sales Act was actively to
support other legislation that de facto would govern an increasing number of
sales transactions. His quite transparent motive to undermine the Uniform
Sales Act, 13 however, may have spelled the death of the proposed federal sales
act, which was successfully opposed by Professor Samuel Williston, the
Uniform Sales Act's author, and his Harvard allies.' 4
But the concept of a federal sales act persisted. The drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code, with Professor Llewellyn at the helm, initially
proposed federal enactment of the bulk of the UCC.l 5 The principal omission
from the proposed federal version-curiously enough-was article 9.l6 By
this time, moreover-a decade since Professor Llewellyn first had urged
adoption of a federal sales act-the Harvard commercial law cadre had come
around and itself taken up the federalization proposal for reasons somewhat
similar to Professor Llewellyn's own. Thus, Robert Braucher, then a Harvard
at 36-37. I am indebted to Professor Frank Kennedy for finding these references. See Kennedy,
Federalism and the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Bus. LAw. 1225, 1226 n.2 (1974).
7. H.R. 6957, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 21 Cong. Rec. 1374 (1890). See Braucher, Federal Enactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Lw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 101 (1951), for a brief discussion of
this bill and similar thinking about federalization during the 1890's.
8. Professor Llewellyn became chief reporter in 1944. For brief histories of both the UCC and
the origins of Professor Llewellyn's participation in the project, which originated as a proposal to
revise the Uniform Sales Act, see Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967);J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
1-6 (2d ed. 1980).
9. H.R. 8176, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). For a discussion of the proposed federal statute by
various scholars, see A Symposium: The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 537 (1940).
10. See Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558 (1940).
11. Id. at 562.
12. Id.
13. See Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465,
479-83 (1987).
14. See, A Statement by Professor Williston, 26 VA. L. REV. 637 (1940); McCurdy, Uniformity and a
Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 572 (1940). William E. McCurdy was, like Samuel Williston, a
professor at Harvard Law School, and the coauthor, with Professor Williston, of CASES ON SALES
(1932). Professor McCurdy's 64-page article, supra, amounted to a brief against the federal statute
owing, in large part, to its divergence from the Uniform Sales Act.
15. See Braucher, supra note 7.
16. Id.
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Law School professor, argued in a Law and Contemporary Problems symposium
some thirty-five years ago that considerations of uniformity "lead almost
inescapably to the conclusion, not that enactment by Congress is desirable,
but that enactment without an act of Congress is undesirable."' 7 Again,
however, Congress failed to enact the federal version of the Uniform
Commercial Code, although it later adopted the UCC for the District of
Columbia."'
Despite these various flirtations with federal enactment of commercial law
generally, however, no one, to my knowledge, has specifically suggested the
federalization of personal property security law. t9 To the contrary, the
pointed omission of article 9 from the proposed federal version of the
Uniform Commercial Code demonstrates rather that, like its realty
counterpart, personal property security law, even as late in our legal history as
the 1950's and early 1960's, was perceived to be within the exclusive province
of state law.
Much of this perception-indeed, the most plausible explanation of the
current embodiment of most legislative commercial law in uniform state
rather than federal legislation-is rooted in constitutional doctrine prevalent
in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Around the
turn of the century, it was commonly presupposed that the tenth amendment
substantially restricted Congress's ability to regulate commercial activities
under the commerce clause.20 Drawing the line between federal and state
jurisdiction proved a difficult exercise. One bright line, that of United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 21 separating manufacturing or productive processes-deemed
to be within the province of state law-from commercial-deemed to be
within the province of federal law-lasted no more than ten years before
federal encroachment began to be felt. 2 2 Federal power was intermittently
expanded, but it was not until 1937 that the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.,2 3 reverted to the broad conception of federal
jurisdiction it had articulated in Gibbons v. Ogden.24 And since Hodel v. Virginia
17. Id. at 104.
18. 77 Stat. 630 (1963).
19. Despite the failure of Congress to enact a federal version of the Uniform Commercial Code,
calls have intermittently been made for federal enactment. See, e.g., Hintze, Disparate Judicial
Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code-The iVeed for Federal Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 722
(1969). Most of these calls are ambiguous in terms of whether the proposed federal enactment
would mirror the earlier federal version of the UCC that excluded article 9 or would include article 9
as well.
20. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-54 (1983); L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232-34 (1978); Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial
Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 477, 481-84 (1933).
21. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), where the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, sustained a Sherman Act injunction against price-fixing by meat
dealers on the theory that although the cattle might have been sent for sale within one state, they
would soon-and expectedly-enter the "current of commerce" among the states. Id. at 399.
23. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For another key case laying to rest the vestiges of Knight and its progeny,
see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,25 only the political process serves to
constrain Congress from regulating even "purely intrastate [commercial
activities] . . . where the activity, combined with like conduct by others
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign
nations."-26 The subject matter of Hodel was, of course, the constitutionality of
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, which, among other
things, empowers the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations
concerning strip-mining in the various states.27
We see, then, that at the time the Uniform Sales Act first was promulgated
in 1906, there did, indeed, exist substantial doubt that Congress had the
power to enact a general commercial statute applicable to both interstate and
intrastate commerce. But today, in contrast, if Congress can constitutionally
regulate real estate in the various states (the subject matter of Hodel), few
scholars would question the constitutional propriety of federal legislation
dealing with personal property-which, by its nature, is less state-specific than
is real estate. So, although the history of the interface of the commerce clause
with the tenth amendment may explain why the drafters of such antecedents
of the Uniform Commercial Code as the Uniform Sales Act and the
Negotiable Instruments Law adopted a uniform state rather than a federal
approach, the continuation of such an approach is hardly required today.
Parenthetically-and without regard to the status of commerce clause
jurisprudence-Congress's power to pass bankruptcy legislation2 8 would, in
itself, surely support the specific suggestion of this article to federalize
personal property security law and integrate it with the Bankruptcy Code.29
And whatever the legitimacy of constitutionally-based constraints on
Congress's powers under the commerce clause, Professor James Rogers has
persuasively argued that constitutionally arguable constraints on Congress's
bankruptcy powers lack substantial authority.30
Having noted the earlier abortive misstarts at federalizing all or part of
commercial law and having disposed of the constitutional issue, we still face
the question with which we began: Should personal property security be
governed by state law, in the form of uniform legislation, or by federal law?
And what criteria should shape our answer?
25. 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981). In fact, since 1937, only once has a federal law or the
enforcement of a federal law posited on Congress's commerce clause powers been struck down as an
infringement of states' rights under the tenth amendment. See National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). But even that case was recently overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). As Professor Gunther remarked, even before
the Garcia case, "[alfter nearly 200 years of government under the Constitution, there are very few
judicially enforced checks on the congressional commerce power." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 113 (10th ed. 1980).
26. 425 U.S. at 277.
27. The Act is at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1979); the regulations provision is § 1211 (c).
28. Art. I, § 8, 4.
29. Analogously, the restrictions on wage garnishments in the Consumer Credit Protection Act
(15 U.S.C. § 1671) are based on the bankruptcy as well as the commerce power.
30. See Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship
between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983).
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The notion of "law" itself suggests one appropriate criterion: the
authority that the law carries. The articulation of the question as a choice
between uniform state law and federal law implicates a second criterion: the
comparative degree of uniformity that could be achieved as between the two.
And the current pace of change in commercial markets suggests a third
criterion: the ease with which the law could be amended as required. Other
factors that should be considered are suggested by the curious history of
commercial law already surveyed: federal judicial competence under the
regime of Swift v. Tyson and state competence, both judicial and legislative,
under the various uniform statutes, including the Uniform Commercial Code
itself. The principal construct of article 9, its notice-filing system, suggests
that ease of filing and of searching for financing statements should also be
considered. Finally, unless much law that extends well beyond the present
scope of article 9 were also to be federalized, the ability to separate personal
property security law from other aspects of commercial law and from the law
of real property mortgages requires comment as well.
A. The Authority of Law
One would think that a suggestion that commercial law in the United
States be federalized would hardly require further advocacy. If a legal
framework is necessary or desirable for a particular activity, the legal
framework should carry the maximum authority possible.
As Professor Llewellyn stated in support of a federal sales act, federal law
offers "a single body of authoritative American law." 3' He added that it was
"vital that any Federal Act be set up unmistakably to show itself as the Code of
Principle of a Whole Field of Law which it cannot help but be, so that its
peculiar character of semi-permanence and analogical development may be
made clear in legislative expression." 3 2 This "legal authority" carries a
distinct benefit of conducing to a greater certainty of both what the law is and
what it may become.
Lack of such legal authority, on the other hand, gives rise to a significant
cost flowing from the doctrine of preemption. In our society, federal law and
state law, of course, are deemed to be compatible; but where the two legal
spheres conflict, directly or indirectly, federal law governs. In the case of
article 9, this preemption has importantly affected both the substantive
content of personal property security law and the mode of deciding what that
law should be. And although these substantive and decisional effects have
perhaps been most celebrated in the context of the interplay between article 9
and the Bankruptcy Code-which will be detailed more extensively later-
they can be observed in other contexts as well.
Consider, for example, the accommodation of security interests and
competing federal tax liens.3 3 The substantive law in article 9 that has
31. Llewellyn, supra note 10, at 558.
32. Id. at 570.
33. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1980), particularly § 6323(c) and (d).
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resolved this conflict3 4 may well be defensible,3 5 but it is certainly unclear that
its exact contours-the trade-off between future advances of a secured party
and tax liens-would have been selected as normatively preferable in the
absence of the federal law (tax lien statute)-state law (article 9) conflict.
Parenthetically, it should also be noted that the authority accorded law is, to a
not inconsiderable extent, a function of its relatively easy accessibility; and
although every law student has a copy of the official edition of the Uniform
Commercial Code, few have ready access to the nonuniform amendments that
have widely proliferated.3 6
Recapitulating then, the federal approach offers a distinct advantage over
the uniform state approach to the law governing commercial transactions
because under our constitutional scheme, federal law carries greater legal
authority and would engender both greater certainty of what the law is and
surer control over its development.
B. The Degree of Uniformity
Nearly every commercial activity in our society affects, even if it does not
directly involve, interstate commerce. Rarely are any transactions entirely
local in their scope, and there are few who would urge that even strictly
intrastate transactions should be governed by law other than that same body
of commercial law applicable to interstate and foreign commerce.
We are currently witnessing in a related field-legal regulation of the
securities and commodities markets 37 -the need for law to be coextensive
with the activity it purports to govern. These markets are becoming
internationalized, as evidenced by recent agreements between Canadian and
34. See UCC § 9-301 (4) ("A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is
perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the extent that it secures advances made before
he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without knowledge of the lien .... ").
The 45-day period during which future advances are protected absolutely against the lien creditor's
interest in the collateral is meant to mesh with the provisions of the federal tax lien law. See UCC
app.II at § 9-301, Reasons for 1972 Change (1978). The Tax Lien Act provides that "[elven though
notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid with respect to a
security interest which came into existence after tax lien filing by reason of disbursements made
before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing, or (if earlier) before the person making such
disbursements had actual notice or knowledge of tax lien filing, but only if such security interest ... is
protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of tax lien filing, out of an
unsecured obligation." 26 U.S.C. § 6323(d)(2) (1980).
The 45-day period in UCC § 9-301(4) points in a different direction from the 45-day period in the
Federal Tax Lien Act. The former is a period of absolute protection for future advances that may be
extended beyond 45 days until the secured party learns of the lien; the latter, however, marks the
outer bound of protection for future advances against the tax lien, with knowledge of the lien that
may come to the secured party even before the period has run destroying the priority of any
subsequent future advances vis-a-vis the tax lien. This may be an instance of imperfect legislative
docking. Imperfect docking is discussed in more detail in Part III C of this article. For an alternative
interpretation, see Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing under Article 9-Parts I and II, 59
B.U.L. REV. 1, 209, 230-34 (1979).
35. See id.
36. See infra notes 12-13.
37. See Requests for Comments, Exchange Act Release No. 21186, Fed.-Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,648 (July 30, 1984); Advance Notice of Regulation of Foreign Futures Transactions in the
United States, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,279 (July 25, 1984).
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American stock exchanges to allow trading in each other's listed stocks 38 and
comparable agreements between domestic and foreign commodities
exchanges permitting settlement on one exchange of trades that have been
executed on another. 39 The scope of securities and commodities transactions
has truly transcended the reach of local governing laws, and the growing
disparity between the two has highlighted the significance of the lack of
uniformity of the substantive law,40 the lack of personal jurisdiction of a court
or regulatory body over all parties engaged in a transaction, 4 t and the
difficulty of enforcement of any judgment or regulatory order even if personal
jurisdiction over a subject is assertable. The legal strategems adopted or
suggested to minimize these shortcomings, including the terms of the
agreements between American and foreign exchanges, are patently second-
best solutions; the currently unattainable ideal is a supranational
governmental authority that could enact and enforce securities and
commodities legislation coterminous with the transactions involved.42
Historiographers rightly warn us of the risks of interpreting historical
events in light of present-day experiences. Historical analogy poses especially
difficult problems when a long period-say, several centuries-separates the
analogical subjects. Nonetheless, current problems can at least suggest to us
the kinds of considerations that might have inclined the framers of the
Constitution to insert such provisions as the interstate commerce clause 43 and
the full faith and credit clause 44 into the Constitution. In 1787, when the
Constitutional Convention met, and increasingly for the next two centuries,
probably no subject has more compellingly required the sameness of
substantive law throughout the United States, personal jurisdiction by courts
over all the parties to a transaction, and enforceability of judgments in every
other jurisdiction than has the nation's expanding commerce. 45
38. See Wall St.J., Aug. 31, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
39. See Summary of the Proposed System of Mutual Offset Between the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange and the Singapore International Monetary Exchange, Ltd., at 2 (Chicago Mercantile
Exchange 1984); CFTC Approves U.S.-Singapore Link; Expands Trading Day in Three Contracts, 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1457 (Aug. 31, 1984).
40. See generally 10A H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 6-4 (1982); Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155 (1982).
41. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (held that
Oklahoma could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose only contact with
state was the fact that an automobile it had elsewhere sold was involved in an accident in Oklahoma);
Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (held that a district
court could not enforce the service of subpoena by the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
on a foreign national in a foreign country). See also Hacker & Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of
Foreign Business under the U.S. Securities Laws, 59 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1981); Rock, Regulatory Control over the
United States, Canadian and United Kingdom Futures Markets, 37 Bus. LAw. 613 (1982).
42. Cf Mosler, Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 425 (1981) (justifying the need for a international judicial body on similar grounds).
43. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
44. Id., art. IV, § 1.
45. As Professor Gunther has noted, "That congressional power [the commerce power] ... was
designed to promote a national market and curb Balkanization of the economy ...... G. GUNTHER,
supra note 25, at 113. Another scholar is even more emphatic. Professor Crosskey has quite
painstakingly argued that the national commerce power was originally meant to be complete rather
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Properly seen, then, uniform state legislation is nothing but an artful
contrivance that is intended to substitute for genuine national legislation. It is
a second-best rather than a first-best response to the need for nationwide
uniformity. 46 To illustrate the deficiency of the uniform state law approach,
consider, more particularly, the variations in article 9, that part of the Uniform
Commercial Code with which this article is concerned-even ignoring for the
moment the variations invited by section 9-401, which concerns the
appropriate place of filing within a state.
In those jurisdictions that have adopted the 1972 or 1977 amendments to
article 9, more than ten have enacted nonconforming amendments to sections
9-103, 4 7 9-104,48 9-105,4 9 9-203,5o 9-301,51 9-302,52 9-306, 5 3 9-307,' 4
than interstitial. See generally W. CROSSKEY, supra note 4, at 173-86. It is interesting to note that while
Professor Crosskey's approach to the Constitution has been well criticized, see, e.g., Hart, The Relations
between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 500 n.28, 501-02 (1954); Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 n.l (1954), the critiques do not seem to take issue with his thesis that
Congress's powers under the commerce clause were intended to be complete.
46. One cannot but note the irony that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which is
best defended as conducing to uniformity of law, see Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 19 REC. A.B. CrrY N.Y. 64 (1964), overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
whichJustice Story justified in light of the need for uniformity in commercial law. Not coincidentally,
then, Judge Friendly, who defended Justice Brandeis's Erie opinion so vigorously against its critics,
also wrote approvingly of the concept of federal commercial law:
Finally, what of the subject about which Mr. Justice Story was primarily thinking when he wrote
Swift v. Tyson-commercial law? Here the effort for uniformity, once the limited value of
Story's approach was recognized, has taken the form of an endeavor to secure the passage of
various uniform acts, and now of the Uniform Commercial Code. The difficulty in getting
uniform acts adopted by fifty state legislatures, the even greater difficulty in getting them
adopted uniformly, the sheer impossibility of getting unruly judges to interpret them uniformly,
and the felt necessity of resisting desirable amendments in order to protect the uniformity so
hardly won, do not require elaboration. The remedy is obvious if it does not have undesirable
side effects-federal enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code ....
Friendly, supra, at 90. It is also interesting to note thatJudge Friendly seemed to think that Congress
could pass a comprehensive federal statute applicable to all commercial matters, including intrastate
transactions, within the United States:
Should such a federal act apply only to transactions where the papers or the goods they
represent cross state lines? Should it exhaust the commerce power by one of the traditional
wordings . . .? Should it go even further and also include all commercial contracts with the
Federal Government, all such contracts sought to be enforced in admiralty or bankruptcy, even
all such contracts passing through the mails? Or should Congress take the still bolder step of
declaring that, in order to make its rule truly workable in these large areas of its enumerated
powers, the small remaining enclaves must also be occupied?
Id. See also supra note 45.
47. These jurisdictions include Alabama, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, California, Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Idaho, Montana, and South
Dakota.
A word about the methodology used to determine the jurisdictions identified in this and
succeeding footnotes is in order. Mr. Claude d'Estree, class of 1988 at Northeastern University
School of Law, compiled the lists of jurisdictions, using as his primary source material the Uniform
Commercial Code Reporting Service (Callaghan & Co., Jan. 1986). Although this service does
identify nonconforming amendments to the official text that have been enacted by different
jurisdictions, it does not explicitly identify which official text (the 1962, 1972, or 1978 edition) the
jurisdiction is presently using. To determine which official text a jurisdiction was using, Mr. d'Estree
consulted the statutes of the various states rather than the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting
Service. Using the state statutes, he first determined whether the jurisdiction had adopted section 9-
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9-312, 55 9-913,56 (despite the great effort made to achieve uniformity by
amending 9-313 quite radically in the 1972 text 57), 9-402,58 9-403, 59 9-404,60
9-405,61 9-406,62 9-407,63 9-408, 64 and 9-504.65 In addition, between five and
307(3)-and if not, the jurisdiction was classified as still using the 1962 edition. If a jurisdiction had
adopted section 9-307(3), however, he then determined whether certificated securities were excluded
from the instruments covered by section 9-305-and if they were, the jurisdiction was classified as
having adopted the 1978 edition; if not, the jurisdiction was classified as having adopted the 1972
edition.
48. Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, California, Colorado, Guam, Minnesota, and Virginia.
49. Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, California,
Guam, Minnesota, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia.
50. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
51. Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Guam, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
52. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
53. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Guam, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia.
54. California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas.
55. Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Guam, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
56. Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, and Virginia.
57. See Reasons for 1972 Change, UCC § 9-313.
58. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
59. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
60. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
61. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
62. Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Virginia.
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ten jurisdictions have enacted variant versions of sections 9-106,66 9-109,67
9-110,68 9-204,69 9-206,70 9-303, 71 9-311,72 9-501, 73 9-505, 74 and 9-507. 75
Fewer variations have been enacted with respect to sections 9-102,76 9-107, 77
9-111,78 9-114,79 9-201,8o 9-202,81 9-208,82 9-304,83 9-305,84 9-310,85
9-314,86 9-318,87 9-503,88 and 9-506.89 Illinois has added a section to part 2
of article 9;90 Illinois and Texas have added a section to part 3 of article 9;91
twenty-seven states (including such key commercial states as California, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) have added sections to part 4 of article 9;92
and eight states have added sections to part 5. 9 3 Finally, at least two states,
North Carolina and Oregon, have added parts to article 9.94
63. Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
64. Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, NewJersey, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Vermont.
65. Alabama, Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas.
66. Arizona, Hawaii, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee.
67. Arkansas, California, Guam, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
68. California, Colorado, Guam, Mississippi, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Vermont.
69. Iowa, New Jersey, North Dakota, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, and South Dakota.
70. Colorado, Georgia, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode Island.
71. California, Georgia, Guam, New York, and Ohio.
72. Arizona, California, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Guam.
73. California, Guam, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Minnesota.
74. Alabama, Arizona, California, the District of Columbia, Guam, Idaho, Iowa, New Mexico,
and Oregon.
75. California, Guam, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma.
76. California, Georgia, Guam, and Iowa.
77. Tennessee.
78. California and Guam.
79. The District of Columbia and Maine.
80. Colorado.
81. South Dakota.
82. Arizona, California, Colorado, and Guam.
83. Arizona, New York, California, and Guam.
84. New York.
85. Alabama, Georgia, and Colorado.
86. Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
87. Connecticut and Ohio.
88. North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Colorado.
89. Iowa, Mississippi, Ohio, and Vermont.
90. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-205.1 (1983).
91. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 9.307.2 (1983); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9-319 (Vernon
Supp. 1987).
92. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
93. California, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
Washington.
94. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-601 et seq. (1986); ORE. REV. STAT. 79:6010 (Supp. 1985).
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Admittedly, the problem of uniformity is largely a matter of degree. It is
better to have a Uniform Commercial Code, even with the above variations,
operating in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and United States
territories, than to have instead fifty-odd more disparate versions of
commercial law. In fact, many if not most of these noted variant amendments
of the UCC are not materially substantive. Moreover, it might further be
argued that the very volume of these amendments evinces a strong state
interest in the law governing security interests in personal property, which
would support a uniform state rather than a federal legislative approach to
such transactions. But be all that as it may, the fact remains that owing to the
number and range of these amendments, uniformity in the law governing
security interests in personal property has been extensively impaired. Parties
cannot know with certainty that the law that currently governs-or might be
held in the future to govern-their transactions is-or will be-the same as
the law with which they are most familiar. The scope of commercial
transactions, especially secured transactions, has burgeoned beyond the law
that is definitionally or arguably applicable to them.
Nor is this an easily rectifiable problem. Public choice literature informs
that absent either a rule requiring unanimity for action or an ex ante rule
binding all to the majority's choice, the greater the number of participant
decisionmakers, the greater the number of choices likely to be made.95 With
more than fifty different legislative bodies acting upon the official edition of
the Uniform Commercial Code (whether we are speaking of the 1962, 1972,
or 1978 edition), there is a significant probability that at least some will select
variant resolutions to different commercial risk situations. One mode of
decisionmaking that might avoid perhaps fifty different versions of the UCC
would be to limit action on a particular edition to a "yea" or "nay" vote. Or it
might be agreed ex ante that the version of a section accepted by a majority of
decisionmaking bodies would be binding on all. Yet, it is precisely such
alternatives that are precluded by a uniform state approach. In the absence of
preemptive federal legislation, nothing prevents a state from enacting those
statutory provisions it wants, provided they do not unreasonably constrain
interstate commerce. Moreover, the ability of a majority of state legislatures
to bind a minority violates the notion that uniformity may be effected only
through voluntary acquiescence by each state in the substance of the
proposed uniform legislation.
The preceding discussion, if anything, probably minimizes the public
choice problems actually posed. Each state legislature, with one exception,96
is composed of two bodies, the members of which may feel strongly about
different aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, some may
entertain pronounced opinions about the priority of security interests in
fixtures, the subject matter of section 9-313, while others may be more
95. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979). For an application of public choice theory in a legal
context, see Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 811-31 (1982).
96. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.
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concerned that a certain kind of transaction be excluded from article 9 by an
amendment to the official version of section 9-104. Although it might be
argued that this problem could also arise under a federal approach-for there
are some 500-odd senators and representatives-there is an important
difference. Idiosyncratic amendments to the UCC are barely visible at the
state level unless and until they occur; but since national attention is riveted
on the congressional process, such amendments would be less likely to pass
through unobtrusively.
Lack of uniformity among the states in the law governing commercial
transactions imposes substantial costs even if the similar aspects of their laws
dwarf their dissimilarities. Commercial parties can work within the confines
of almost any legal regime, provided only that they are certain of the outcome
ex ante. But the particular idiosyncratic amendments of various states are not
so easily detected, analyzed, and contractually avoided. Nor, since we are
speaking of article 9, is the answer simply to allow commercial parties to
designate the law of a particular jurisdiction with which they are most familiar.
Article 9, as all of personal property security law, is premised on the need to
protect third parties-its terms cannot simply be circumvented by different
contractual provisions as can, for example, the terms of delivery97 or
payment 98 in article 2.
Of course, certainty of law can be achieved at some price. Lawyers can and
do research state variations and advise their clients accordingly. But other
matters being equal, it surely is disadvantageous so to structure a system that
a lawyer is required to detect and analyze disparities when an alternative
structure for achieving sameness of commercial law is available. Legal
research takes time, and time is a cost that increases the price of credit and
thereby decreases its overall availability at the margin. And, in fact,
commercial law casebooks are replete with cases where adequate research was
either never conducted or failed to lead parties to take those steps necessary
optimally to protect their interests. 99
C. Ease of Amendment
Commerce changes over time, and there is reason to believe that the pace
of change has been accelerating. And as the form of transactions and the risks
that inhere in them change, so must the law change; the alternative-change
of commercial practice without correlative change of the applicable governing
law-introduces or enhances the irrelevance of law to the real world. How do
our two approaches to commercial law compare on this score?
97. See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-319 to 2-323, which uniformly use the expression "unless otherwise
agreed."
98. See id. See also UCC § 2-511(1) ("Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condition
to the seller's duty to tender and complete any delivery.").
99. See, e.g., Matter of Hammons, 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure to file in correct county);
United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.H. 1966) (failure to specify that
general intangibles were included as collateral); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir.
1973) (failure to classify collateral correctly resulting in failure to file in correct state).
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One can answer this question by considering and contrasting such
legislation as the Bankruptcy Code and its course of passage 00 -which may
be analogized to an amendment process, since the Code replaced its
predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act-with the reworking of the Uniform
Commercial Code that we have witnessed for the past twenty-five years. The
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code began with hearings of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1968 to determine whether a commission should be
created to study the Bankruptcy Act. Thereafter, Congress created such a
commission, which then proceeded to conduct its own deliberations and
publish its own recommendations. This report was followed by the
introduction of bills in both the House and Senate, beginning in 1973, further
congressional hearings and reports over the next five years, and final passage
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. As Kenneth Klee has so aptly recorded for
our benefit, "Pub. L. No. 95-598 the Bankruptcy Code is the culmination of
ten years of effort involving hundreds of participants."' 0'1
Indeed, because the Bankruptcy Code constituted a wholesale revision of a
body of law, its legislative history arguably is more appropriately comparable
to the process of drafting rather than amending the Uniform Commercial
Code. Approximately two decades rather than one, however, elapsed
between the charge of the Uniform Laws Commissioners to Professor
Llewellyn to revise the Uniform Sales Act and the eventual production of the
1962 edition of the UCC.' 0 2 But should the Bankruptcy Code's legislative
course be used as a measuring rod for comparing an amending rather than a
drafting process, the problematic nature of the uniform amending process is
just as clearly evident. As of the beginning of 1986, approximately fourteen
years after the 1972 amendments were promulgated, ten states had still not
adopted those amendments.' 0 3 And, eight years after the 1977 amendments
were proposed, a mere ten states had adopted them.10 4
The cumbersome nature of the amendment process is not inconsequential.
In earlier discussing the lack of uniformity, I alluded primarily to the
disparities among the several jurisdictions that had adopted the same version
of the Uniform Commercial Code, most notably the 1972 edition. The
problem of lack of uniformity is further exacerbated, moreover, by the fact
that not every relevant jurisdiction is even working from the same edition of
the UCC.
100. For a general and fairly concise legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, see Klee,
Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275 (1980).
101. See id. at 277.
102. See supra note 8.
103. Alaska, Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the Virgin Islands.
104. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Guam, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
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D. Legislative Competence
Although the federal approach may offer advantages vis-a-vis the uniform
state approach in terms of legal authority, uniformity, and easier
amendability, the fact is that in making a choice, we are not writing on a clean
slate. The constitutional reason that best explains the origins of state
legislative activity in the commercial law field no longer presents an obstacle
to federalization, but the by-product of this constitutional history-long
legislative experience among the states with the subject matter of commercial
law, including secured transactions-may be thought, in itself, powerfully to
argue in favor of retaining the uniform state approach. Thus, today, rather
than being tendered on the basis of now-discarded constitutional doctrine,
the deference-to-state-judgment argument is more apt to be based on the
closer proximity of states to most transactions governed by article 9, the long
familiarity of states with the subject matter of commercial law, and the view
that the federal legislative menu is already too full to permit the governance
of commercial matters on an ongoing basis.' 0 5
No matter how the legislative competence argument is articulated, the
value of state legislative judgments figures as an important supporting
rationale. But except for the selection of Uniform Commissioners by each
state, 10 6 the reality is that the uniform state approach is clearly meant to
preclude individual state legislative judgments on all but marginal matters-
such as the appropriate location for an article 9 filing within a state. Few, if
any, knowledgeable persons would really favor states, on the basis of their
allegedly superior expertise in matters commercial or their familiarity with the
historical record, passing nonconforming amendments to article 9.
Is it not possible, however, that a superior legislative competence is
manifested precisely in states' passage of nonconforming amendments? 0 7
Although the drafters might originally have regarded a certain resolution of a
particular issue to have been optimal, in practice, the nonconforming
amendment might prove to be preferable. And when this is the case, the
nonconforming amendment can then be coopted by the Permanent Editorial
Board and recommended for adoption by other states. According to this
view, then, variations in the law may be a blessing in disguise-admittedly
generating some costs, but also fostering valuable offsetting benefits.
Whether real or idealized for the sake of supporting a uniform state
approach, this more favorable view of lack of uniformity reflects Justice
Brandeis's conception, expressed in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,10 8 of states
as laboratories, experimenting with different laws. In the words of Henry
Hart, "a political system which maximizes the opportunities for coping
105. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1227.
106. For a description of the operation and history of the Uniform Commissioners, see Dunham,
A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs.
233 (1965).
107. For an expression of this view, see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 1233.
108. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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effectively with the problems of social living is better than one that minimizes
them. This means a federal system."' 10 9 But however appealing the Brandeis-
Hart perspective may be with respect to private law generally-that is, the
benefits of experimentation at the state law-making level exceed the costs of
the resulting lack of uniformity nationwide-the argument is quite tenuous
when applied to the Uniform Commercial Code in general and article 9 in
particular. Most importantly, section 1-102 pointedly states that one of the
three most important "underlying purposes and policies of the [UCC] is to
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."' 1 In short, the
deference to state authority characteristic of uniform state legislation is more
a matter of style than of substance. Such deference would hardly be desirable
in the case of legislation that must apply uniformly to all transactions within
the United States. It seems somewhat disingenuous, then, to argue that lack
of uniformity qualifies as a benefit rather than a cost of a uniform state as
compared to a federal approach. Because we do not want nonconforming
amendments, the conversion of a cost of a uniform state approach into a
purported benefit smacks strongly of sophistry.
Moreover, the nonconforming amendments that have been adopted by
states and later coopted by the Permanent Editorial Board as part of the
official version of the Uniform Commercial Code have often been
recommended primarily because their adoption would again make the UCC
more uniform, not necessarily because their substance truly represents a
preferable solution to a particular risk-bearing problem. Consider, for
example, the most notorious of these amendments, the 1972 version of
section 9-313. Although the last two paragraphs of the Reasons for 1972
Change pay homage to the political desirability of the amendment on grounds
other than reestablishing uniformity, the bulk of the Reasons more forthrightly
acknowledges that in light of the failure of California and Iowa to adopt the
1962 version of section 9-313 and the relatively successful efforts of other
states to amend it, the overriding goal of uniformity required closer
conformation of this section to the expectations of the real estate bar."' Still,
many, if not most, of the sections affected were improved by the 1972
amendment. 1 2  For example, consider future advances, the changed
treatment of which had been suggested by operational history under the 1962
version of article 9. It is such practical experiences, which know no state
boundaries, that are truly assimilable to experiments by which ideas are
tested-and they would have occurred under federal just as under uniform
state legislation.
In legal literature of the past decade, an effort has been made to validate
Justice Brandeis's state-laboratory thesis as a model of economic efficiency.
Different states compete for legal jurisdiction over individuals, other legal
109. See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 542 (1954).
110. UCC § 1-102(2)(c).
111. See Reasons for 1972 Change, UCC § 9-313.
112. Id. §9-312.
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"persons" such as various kinds of enterprises, and transactions., 13 The
states win or lose this competition depending upon the degree to which their
legal regimes facilitate or retard transactions. In contrast, it is noted, the
federal government competes with no other entity. Presumptively, then, state
solutions are efficient-otherwise they would not have survived in the
competitive legal world-while federal legal solutions are inefficient." 4 The
comparisons expressly or impliedly invoked are: first, to the product, capital,
and other markets in which business enterprises compete (markets that
produce resolutions closer to Kaldor optimal than would be achieved in a
state-directed business environment); and, second, to the Darwinian
competition among biological forms of life in which the fittest survive.
Although there is, indeed, some persuasive force to these metaphors in
certain substantive areas of the law, the movement from premise (states have
competitors, but the federal government has none) to conclusion
(presumptively, state solutions are efficient, while federal solutions are not) is
far too facile. This linguistic exercise begs the hard questions. Does not the
federal government compete in a world of legal jurisdictions? And if the
argument is limited to the claim that the states compete more extensively than
does the federal government, why not argue normatively for county, city, or
even township legislation, since this would generate even more competition
and thus conduce to even greater efficiency?
Stripped of perhaps distracting analogies, the significance of a nexus
between varied legal possibilities and efficient transactions in the real world
may be seen to turn upon which of two models of law-one facilitative and the
other regulatory-should obtain. The primary purpose of facilitative law is, as
the term implies, to ease the consummation of transactions. Frequently, this
facilitative function takes the form of offering off-the-shelf standardized rules
that save transacting parties the expense of specifying these rules in their
contracts-although nothing prevents the parties, in unusual cases, from
specifying other terms that may be more suitable to their circumstances. The
regulatory model of law, in contrast, presupposes a more activist
governmental stance. The lawmaking body does not simply offer
standardized rules subject to such modification as the parties may desire;
rather, it must prescribe rules by which the parties necessarily will be bound.
In commercial transactions generally, the facilitative seems clearly
preferable as the dominant model--otherwise, what remains of the rationale
for capitalism, with the inevitable inequities that it tolerates? But a general
preference for the facilitative model hardly necessitates rejection of regulation
in specific contexts. And article 9 is generally considered to be such a special
context-so much so that some scholars, including Professors Douglas Baird
113. See, e.g., Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. STUD.
251 (1977) (states as competing in the market for corporate charters).
114. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.
REV. 699 (1984) (arguing that state corporate law is presumptively efficient, while federal securities
law is not).
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and Thomas Jackson, have argued that various forms of transactions that are
not currently assimilated to secured transactions and subsumed under article
9 should, nonetheless, be subjected to its filing requirements. 1 5 Without
necessarily agreeing with Professors Baird and Jackson's specifics, it can be
argued that the larger framework into which their proposals fit presupposes
that personal property security law exists for the protection of third parties.
Indeed, the raison d'etre of all creditor-protection law, including that of
personal property security law, requires choice of a legal structure having at
least some regulatory characteristics.
Moreover, it seems inaccurate automatically to equate federal law with a
regulatory and state law with a facilitative model. Commercial law, whether
legislated via a federal or a uniform state approach (or, for that matter, a
nonuniform state approach), can offer parties various options for transacting,
thereby allowing them to choose the course that is best for them. Law can
also supply presumptions that operate among these various choices,
specifying those terms that the parties would probably have independently
selected. Commercial parties are thereby able to avoid or reduce the
transaction costs otherwise borne in explicitly contracting about the same
matters. Indeed, this mode of facilitating transactions has been adopted by
the Uniform Commercial Code in the price and delivery terms specified in
sections 2-319 through 2-324, the risk-of-loss provisions of sections 2-519 and
2-510, and numerous other contexts. And where this facilitative model is
appropriate-in other words, where third-party interests are not implicated-
it can be implemented regardless of whether the federal or the uniform state
approach is adopted.
Finally, it should again be noted that one of the most facilitative aspects of
law is its easy accessibility and relative certainty. Thus those who favor a
facilitative approach as the dominant influence on a particular body of
substantive law should recognize that confusion over legal references, which
poses a more substantial risk under a uniform state than under a federal
approach, can at some point become so great that the expenditure necessary
to discover the law inhibits transactions.
E. Judicial Competence
The question of judicial competence, broadly defined, might also initially
be thought to cut both ways. On the one hand, one probably finds fewer
adherents of a Brandeisian view of experimentation at the judicial level-for
federal judges, given the different circuits, seem fully capable of
experimenting with different legal approaches to the same problem when
plausible conflicting or supplementary views do exist. Furthermore, it is
generally perceived-although not necessarily true-that the greater
115. See Baird &Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Artice 9, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 175 (1983).
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prestige-and in some cases, the greater pay-has resulted in a better
qualified and hence more competent federal than state judiciary.
On the other hand, however, the congested state of the federal docket has
been well publicized, and further expansion of the courts' workload will
intuitively appear to some to be the greatest cost of federalizing personal
property security law, whether or not it is integrated with the Bankruptcy
Code. Indeed, the consequent aggravation of an already disturbing
bottleneck in the judicial system, it might be argued, would aid neither the
general cause of justice nor that of secured parties and other creditors who,
like most other litigants, want their disputes handled expeditiously.
Less intuitively apparent, however, is the extent to which, on a judicial
level, the law of personal property has already become federalized. A perusal
of volume 40 of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service," l6 the
latest bound volume of this reporter available at the time of this writing,
reveals that 132 cases primarily concerned article 9 rather than other articles
of the UCC. Of these cases, eighty-three-or sixty-three percent of the
total-were decisions of federal courts, while only forty-nine--or thirty-seven
percent of the total-were decisions of state courts. Although there is no
guarantee that volume 40 contains an accurate representative sampling of all
reported article 9 cases, there also is no reason to believe otherwise,
particularly in the period since the institution of the bankruptcy courts, either
as created in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or its 1984 amendments"17 dealing
with the consequences of Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co. 118 Admittedly, there is also no assurance that all decisions, both reported
and unreported, in which article 9 questions arose reflect the same percentage
terms; but since both state and federal decisions frequently go unreported for
a variety of reasons, a more complete, yet practically unattainable, picture
would probably not appreciably alter the statistic that nearly two-thirds of all
article 9 cases are already decided in federal courts.
Regardless of the statistics, however, nothing precludes Congress from
tailoring federal jurisdiction as it chooses. For example, were the subject
matter of article 9 to be federalized and integrated with the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress might well set a minimum dollar amount in nonbankruptcy cases
that would have to be met before the federal courts would have jurisdiction in
the matter; otherwise, state courts would handle the controversy even if the
law involved were federal.
F. The Notice-Filing System
Much of the tilting in favor of a federal approach to commercial
transactions relates to the greater variability of law that inheres in a uniform
116. David Bunker, a student in the class of 1986 at Northeastern University Law School,
compiled the statistics that follow in the text during the Winter 1985-86 quarter.
117. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333 et seq. (1984).
118. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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state approach. But article 9 is particularly concerned with third-party
protection, which is primarily provided by that article's notice-filing system;
and in contrast to their position with respect to most other aspects of article 9,
the drafters here specifically acquiesced in state variations of filing
requirements. 1 9 Some states require centralized filing exclusively in the
office of the Secretary of State, excepting only fixture filings; other states
require filing at the county level, either alone or in conjunction with
centralized filing, depending upon the nature of collateral.' 2 0 The drafters'
amenability to local filing reflected the belief of some "that most credit
inquiries about local businesses, farmers and consumers come from local
sources; convenience is served by having the files locally available and there is
not great advantage in centralized filing."' 12
But the sanctioning of alternatives for filing on a state-by-state basis
should not obscure the drafters' own preference. Certainly a fair reading of
the Official Comment to section 9-401, from which the above quotation about
"local businesses" has been drawn, indicates that the drafters clearly
preferred centralized filing: "The more completely the files are centralized on
a state-wide basis, the easier and cheaper it becomes to procure credit
information; the more the files are scattered in local filing units, the more
burdensome and costly."' 122
If anything, experience suggests that the drafters underestimated the full
costs of both localized filing and the peculiar variations exhibited among the
several states. The difficulties posed for the party required to file have
included the possibility that he may file in the wrong county;' 23 or that he may
file at the state level but forget to file at the county level, 124 or vice versa; 125 or
that he may neglect to refile as the location of the collateral changes.'
26
Moreover, a secured party may fail initially to file in the correct place because
of having misclassified the nature of the debtor's property interest. 27 From
the perspective of the party who wants to search for possible prior security
interests in the debtor's property, the principal shortcomings of localized
filing stem from the collateral-based nature of the filing requirements. 28
Thus, article 9's filing system would be problematic even had the drafters
not validated any local filing, but rather had insisted on the exclusivity of
centralized filing with respect to security interests in all collateral except
119. UCC § 9-401. Compare First Alternative subsection (1), with the Second and Third
Alternatives.
120. See the three alternative versions of UCC § 9-401.
121. Id. Comment 1.
122. Id.
123. See Matter of Hammons, 614 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1980).
124. See, e.g., Package Machinery Co. v. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co., 51 A.D.2d 771, 380 N.Y.S.2d
248 (1976).
125. See, e.g., Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (Super. Ct.
1964).
126. In re Utah Agricorp, 12 B.R. 573 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
127. See, e.g., In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973).
128. See Phillips, supra note 34, at 210-22.
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fixtures. As I have detailed elsewhere,' 29 the transactions of most parties
affected by the filing system relate primarily to the debtor rather than to the
collateral; only infrequently do their transactions relate more to the collateral
than to a debtor from whom repayment of a debt or satisfaction of ajudgment
is sought. Accordingly, a location-of-collateral as opposed to location-of-
debtor filing system has complicated the dealings of third parties with the
debtor and made the task of discovering prior security interests in his
personal property more difficult.
In contrast, a federal approach to personal property security law suggests
a national filing system that would obviate any need to distinguish between a
location-of-debtor and location-of-collateral rule. Such an approach, rather
than focusing upon which of many possible jurisdictions has the closest
connection either to the collateral or to the debtor, would permit both the
filing and the retrieval of relevant information from anywhere in the United
States and would obviate the necessity of extensive research, with the
attendant mailing of financing statements and information statements to
multiple offices around the country. Current technology easily permits such a
system.
It may, of course, be objected that nothing precludes the states from
agreeing to and adopting a national filing system as part of a uniform
approach. But the fact remains that they have not; nor, to the best of my
knowledge, has it been suggested that they do so. In any event, even if most
jurisdictions agreed to computerize filing on a national basis, they would still
likely insist on some kind of state identification in that system-and at that
point, secured parties required to file would be exposed to the same kind of
risk of error they now encounter with localized filing. States are bound to
insist upon such identification because without it, application of a particular
state's version of the Uniform Commercial Code to the transaction in
question would be perceived as less justified and thus become uncertain. And
even if a uniform amendment to article 9 implementing a national filing
system were proposed, the problems of amendment and local variation
already identified in connection with other provisions of article 9 might still
arise. For example, as long as some states still insisted on localized paper
filings, some of the problems currently associated with such filings would
persist.
Admittedly, certain problems would also attend a national computerized
filing system, including accurate identification of the debtor, the possibility of
fraudulent inputs, and excessive accessibility to the credit status of debtors.
Without minimizing these or other potential problems-and with the caveat
that the details of this proposal are at the moment less important than the
concept-one may still observe that there is no reason why the tax
identification number of a debtor (which, to the best of my knowledge, hardly
ever changes) cannot serve to differentiate debtors along with their names-
129. See id. at 6.
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whether individual, corporate, or otherwise. Nor is it clear why the
opportunity for fraudulent input would be any greater with a computerized
system than with a paper system that currently requires only the debtor's
purported signature. Finally, with respect to easy accessibility to the credit
status of debtors, we must never forget that the ultimate objective of a notice-
filing system is not notice, but knowledge of the security interests. 30
Collectively, we are better off if interested parties know of other credit
extensions to the debtor and can accurately determine the terms of their own
projected dealings with the debtor in light of the risks presented. In short,
the easier accessibility to credit information to which a national computerized
filing system would conduce should, on balance, be counted as a benefit
rather than a cost.
G. The Separateness of Personal Property Security Law
One quite natural reaction to my suggested federalization of personal
property security law would be to inquire whether this would not also require
the federalization of much additional law besides that currently covered by
article 9. And if so, would not this proposal entail a much more radical
redefinition of federal-state roles than may initially appear to be the case?
Two specific bodies of law that might be implicated are other aspects of
commercial law, especially those embraced in the remainder of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and real property security law. Yet, while there may be
arguments for federalizing these other bodies of law-and this article is not
intended to negate that possibility-the factors we have hitherto considered
simply do not militate as strongly in favor of such federalization as they do
with respect to the law relating to personal property security interests.
Consider, first, the law relating to real property mortgages-concerning
which a consensus in favor of uniformity-even at the state level-has not
even begun to crystallize. Without such consensus, the choice of uniformity
as a prime factor by which to adjudge the merits of a federal vis-a-vis a
uniform state approach is itself problematic.
Consider, next, other aspects of commercial law, which, unlike the law
relating to real property mortgages, are acknowledged to require a uniform
treatment. These are, in the main, the subject matter of articles 2 (sale of
goods), 3 (commercial paper), and 4 (bank deposits and collections) of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Several differences between the subject matters
of these articles and that of article 9 are apparent. Except in limited respects,
such as warranty law-where the pressure for true uniformity is among those
considerations that explain the passage of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Actl 31-these articles have not been subjected to nonuniform amendment to
the same extent as has been article 9. Also, there is no overriding focus of
these articles comparable to a filing system, the operation of which has been
130. See Phillips, Formalist Trends in Commercial Law Scholarship (paper on file).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982).
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hindered by a uniform state rather than a federal approach to the subject
matter. And most significantly, these articles relate to the ex ante allocation of
risks or the ex post allocation of losses in numerous contexts having nothing to
do with the bankruptcy of one of the transacting parties. As the next section
of this article makes clear, the same cannot be said of personal property
security law, which integrally relates to the risk of insolvency. And the
dominant body of law that governs in the insolvency context is the federal law
of bankruptcy.
If these factors do suggest that the law of personal property security does
meet the criteria we have discussed to a degree greater than do other key
aspects of commercial law covered by the Uniform Commercial Code,'132 is
article 9 sufficiently separable from the other articles of the UCC to permit the
federalization of only the former? The number of interacting sections
between, for instance, articles 2 and 9 are relatively few-sections 2-326 and
9-114, dealing with consignments and similar transactions, and section 9-113,
relating to security interests that arise under article 2, come to mind-and
they are fewer than, say, the interactions between article 9 and the Bankruptcy
Code. Nor would the separation of the subject matter of article 9 from the
UCC's other articles destroy tightly coordinated cross-references and
interactions. Section 9-113, for example, refers to security interests arising
under the article on sales; but article 2, except in shipment contexts, never
explicitly provides for a seller's lien, the apparent reference of section 9-113.
Key terms in article 9-"instrument,"133 for example-are not even defined in
the same way in which they are in other articles of the Code.
Parenthetically, the present generation of students may not realize and
some commercial law scholars may tend to forget that at one time, personal
property security law and other commercial law were the subjects of different
legislation. Of course, no one would urge reinstatement of the various
statutes that used to govern personal property security-for example, the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, various
chattel mortgage statutes, and the like. But if the question is whether the law
of personal property security should inseparably be conjoined in the Uniform
Commercial Code with other branches of commercial law, the countervailing
strength of the relationship of personal property security law and bankruptcy
law must be considered. It is this nexus that the next part of this article
addresses.
To summarize, then, a uniform state as compared with a federal approach
to commercial law, especially the law governing security interests in personal
property, suffers from lack of uniformity (the very objective of the exercise), a
132. I exclude from this category ("other key aspects of commercial law covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code") the law applicable to bills of lading, as that law has largely been federalized by
the Federal Bills of Lading Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 81 et seq. And surely the confusion that has been
generated by applying federal law to interstate shipments and state law to intrastate shipments is less
desirable than an approach that would-like my suggestion concerning the substance of article 9 of
the UCC-completely federalize the law of bills of lading.
133. Compare the definition of "instrument" in § 9-105(l)(i) with its definition in § 3-102(l)(e).
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cumbersome amendment process, needless legal transactional costs, and a
strong, although not inseparable, bond to a local rather than national filing
system. State legislation, even where uniform, lacks the authority accorded to
national legislation in our federal system. Given the degree to which the
federal courts are already the key interpreters of this body of law,
federalization of personal property security law-even if it expanded federal
jurisdiction over commercial disputes-would not entail a wholesale
reallocation ofjudicial resources in this area. And finally, although separation
of the law of personal property security from what is conventionally regarded
as the body of commercial law-the Uniform Commercial Code-might entail
some costs, these would appear to be slight and must, in any event, be
measured against the relatively greater costs that the federalization of the law
of personal property security would avert.
III
INTEGRATION WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The federal character of bankruptcy law is a compelling additional reason
to federalize personal property security law. In fact, such federalization
should take the form of integrating personal property security law with the
Bankruptcy Code. The proposal for integration relates to four factors: the
essential relationship between the notion of a security interest and the risk of
bankruptcy; the emission of inconsistent and sometimes competitive incentive
signals by article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code; the phenomenon of "imperfect
docking" between article 9, as state law, and the Bankruptcy Code, as federal
law, despite obvious attempts at coordinating the two bodies of law; and,
finally, the ability to tackle more directly certain fundamental questions once
personal property security law and federal bankruptcy law are coordinated.
A. The Nexus Between Secured Credit and the Risk of Bankruptcy
The greatest risk against which a security interest is intended to protect
the secured party is the debtor's insolvency. It seems almost axiomatic, then,
that personal property security interest law is in function, if not in form, an
aspect of the law related to bankruptcies and therefore should be part of it.
Several factors might be thought inconsistent with the asserted primacy of
the personal property security interest-bankruptcy relationship. One is that
article 9 protects the secured party against more than the risk of bankruptcy.
Another is that the principal parties protected by the linchpin of article 9's
construct, the filing system, are other secured parties,134 not lien or trade
creditors, who are generally perceived as being more at risk in the event of the
debtor's bankruptcy and for whom the protection afforded by the Bankruptcy
Code was primarily intended.
134. For an example of such an argument, see Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible
Ownership, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (1983).
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That personal property security law pertains to risks other than that of
bankruptcy, however, cannot hide the reality that bankruptcy is the chief risk
to which such law is directed. True, article 9 offers protection, in varying
degrees, to the secured party vis-a-vis other secured parties, 35 purchasers of
the collateral and its proceeds from the debtor, 36 lien creditors, 137 and
others. But owing to the countervailing protections accorded to some of
these other competing interests-for example, purchasers of the collateral or
proceeds in the ordinary course of business, 138 or purchasers and possessors
of chattel paper that is merely proceeds of collateral in which the secured
party claims an interest139-the secured party's interest, even if perfected,
may be subordinated to such competing interests, if not extinguished entirely.
The secured party who has perfected his security interest, then, is most
completely protected against lien creditors and other secured parties who
subsequently file or otherwise perfect their interests in the collateral-that is,
he is most surely protected against the bankruptcy risk.
Factual experience seems to bear out this conclusion that bankruptcy is the
paramount risk against which the security interest is designed to guard.
Conflicts between a secured party and the bankruptcy trustee greatly
outnumber those between secured parties outside of bankruptcy or between a
secured party and a genuine lien creditor. Returning to the statistics drawn
from volume 40 of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service cited
earlier,' 40 we noted that 83 of 132 cases dealing with article 9-or 63
percent-arose in the federal courts. Of those, 69-or 83 percent of the
federal total-were bankruptcy cases at either the trial (the federal bankruptcy
courts) or the appellate levels (federal district courts or courts of appeals).
Even if the nonbankruptcy federal cases are added to the state cases, then, a
majority of the article 9 cases related to the bankruptcy risk. Nor is there any
reason to suppose that these proportions do not roughly reflect the risks
against which secured parties have actually sought protection.
Secured parties extend credit to debtors and want payment.' 4' In the
typical secured transaction, the collateral serves as a "security blanket,"
recourse to which is only a second-best resolution for the creditor. Focusing
undue attention upon the protection afforded secured parties against
purchasers of the collateral distorts the overwhelming concern of the secured
party to be repaid. In contrast, focusing upon the secured party's desire to be
protected against the bankruptcy risk places the role of collateral in its proper
perspective.
135. See UCC § 9-312.
136. See UCC §§ 9-307, 9-301(1)(c).
137. See UCC § 9-301(1)(b).
138. See UCC § 9-307(1).
139. See UCC § 9-308(b).
140. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
141. See Phillips, supra note 34, at 6.
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An interesting body of literature has arisen discussing why security
interests exist in the first place,' 42 given the heuristic insight of Professors
Franco Modigliani and M.H. Miller that a debtor's cost of capital should be
constant, regardless of the make-up of that capital.' 43 Creditors can and do
compensate for any risk through their terms of credit with the debtor,
provided only that the risk is known and calculable. Hence, because the
taking of security by some creditors must necessarily increase the risk of
unsecured creditors, the latter will charge the debtor more for their credit as
the former-the secured creditors-charge less. In the aggregate-and
without further explanation-it is uncertain what has been gained.
To answer why secured credit exists, some have suggested a monitoring
theme. 144 If having a security interest provides that party best able to monitor
with a positive incentive to monitor, 145 or alternatively provides those
creditors least able to monitor with a substitute for monitoring,' 46 and if
others benefit from these monitoring and quasi-monitoring activities, then
perhaps the aggregate cost to the debtor of credit-both secured and
unsecured-will be less than the same amount of unsecured credit would have
been.
But another answer to the question of why secured credit exists has also
been suggested, and it is in some ways more persuasive than the monitoring
explanation: A debtor's bankruptcy, to which secured credit largely responds,
is so unpredictable and so costly that allaying the creditor's anxiety in this
regard will reduce the debtor's overall cost of capital. 147 And the uncertainty
142. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); White,
Effciency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984); Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL. STUD. 1 (1981); Jackson & Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979).
143. See Modigliani & Miller, Theory of Investment, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory ofInvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
144. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 142; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 142.
145. See Levmore, supra note 142, at 55-58. Professor Levmore, unlikeJackson & Kronman, supra
note 142, identifies the secured party as the most talented monitor and suggests that a decrease in
the overall cost of capital might occur because others, particularly unsecured creditors, might then
be able to freeride on the monitoring efforts of the secured party.
146. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 142, at 1158-61. Professors Jackson and Kronman
choose the counterintuitive route and suggest that the parties who become secured parties, such as
banks, are the least talented monitors. In effect, then, the security interest becomes a substitute for
the monitoring activities in which other creditors, most notably trade creditors, are able to engage.
Although creative, Professors Jackson and Kronman's suggestion has little basis in reality. Banks and
other institutional secured creditors regularly review the financial statements of the debtor; few trade
creditors do, although their extensions of credit, through the mediation of financial rating companies
such as Dun & Bradstreet, are ultimately based on the same financial statements as well as such other
factors as their own and other trade creditors' experience with the particular debtor. And other
secured creditors, such as purchase money secured parties, are clearly superior monitors. The
machinery manufacturer or distributor who takes back a purchase money security interest will
frequently play a role in servicing the asset sold. That servicing effort constitutes a monitoring effort.
147. See Castanias, Bankruptcy Risk and Optimal Capital Structure, 38J. FIN. 1617 (1983) ("empirical
results ... are consistent with the thesis that ex ante default costs are large enough to induce the
typical firm to hold an optimum mix of debt and equity." Id. at 1629); Scott, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt
and Optimal Capital Structure, 32J. FIN. 1 (1977). But see Smith & Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and
Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34J. FIN. 247 (1979) (arguing that deterrence of asset substitution
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the creditor faces extends beyond the possibility of a debtor's bankruptcy to
the uncertainty, if the debtor does become bankrupt, of the creditor's
realization out of such a proceeding. The exceedingly wide variance of past
outcomes makes prediction of future losses stemming from bankruptcy highly
tentative and constantly amendable in light of new data. True, the creditor
can reduce these uncertainties by diversification, but diversification's
maximum prophylactic effect, even theoretically, is a reduction rather than an
elimination of the costs associated with bankruptcy. The risk is systemic.
Moreover, when we advance beyond normative models based on theory to the
observed reality of various banks with respect to energy loans, third-world
loans, and the like, loan portfolios may be much less diversified than we would
probably expect-and certainly much less diversified than a stock portfolio
that is intentionally structured to reduce the unsystemic risk in light of past
statistics about various industries and corporations. In sum, although
probably no one factor explains the existence and characteristics of secured
credit in our society,148 surely among the most compelling explanations is the
uncertainty associated with bankruptcy.
A second possible response to my suggestion that a security interest
primarily relates to the bankruptcy risk could be based on Professor Baird's
observation that article 9's filing system, the keystone of the perfection
process, without which the secured party is ordinarily not protected against
any of the third parties we have mentioned, is searched by other secured
parties or potential secured parties and serves to protect them, not trade
creditors and others.' 49 In truth, Professor Baird's observation needs to be
empirically tested, but his model of creditor behavior seems excessively
inflexible. Quite obviously, if security interests affect the risk of trade
creditors and others, their relative inexpertise (as compared, arguably, with
that of banks and other financial institutions) in searching the filing system
and adjudging credit risk on the basis of those filings disclosed still would not
diminish their ultimate reliance upon such filings. Trade creditors do rely
upon firms in the business of assessing credit risk such as Dun and Bradstreet.
And, indeed, these credit institutions do search filing systems, and their
discoveries are among the important data transmitted to trade creditors in
their credit ratings of various debtors.
In any event, even were Professor Baird to be proven correct, the question
of which third parties take advantage of the filing system is distinct from the
question of which risks secured parties are primarily seeking to minimize.
is the best explanation for secured credit). A variant nexus between the bankruptcy risk and an
explanation for secured credit is that unsecured creditors, given the bankruptcy risk and the
possibility that statutory priorities will wipe out their prospect of being paid more than a small
fraction of their claims, will be somewhat indifferent to a security interest covering some or all of a
debtor's assets. If so, the aggregate cost of credit will be lower if the debtor grants security interests
to certain creditors, thereby decreasing the cost of credit they extend, and not to others, who will not
raise their cost of extending credit proportionately. See White, supra note 142, at 481-89.
148. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 360-67 (1984).
149. See Baird, supra note 134.
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Professor Baird's observation that only other secured parties or potential
secured parties directly check for filed financing statements is not necessarily
inconsistent with the observation that secured parties are concerned with
security primarily to reduce the bankruptcy risk. After all, the primary reason
for wanting priority in collateral vis-a-vis other secured parties is the same one
that underlies the desire for such priority vis-a-vis unsecured creditors: The
secured party must deal with the risk that the debtor will be unable to make all
creditors whole.
Integration of the law of personal property security with that of
bankruptcy, it should be noted, does not mean that the law of personal
property security would be inapplicable outside of bankruptcy. The priority
conflict between two secured parties that materialized without the formal
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, for example, would be governed by the
same body of law. 150 While its federalization of and integration with
bankruptcy law would recognize the primacy of the bankruptcy risk, such
integration need not diminish the law's relevance to other risks in other
contexts.
B. Conflicting Incentive Signals
A second factor that argues for the integration of personal property
security law with the law of bankruptcy is that, as currently drafted, article 9
and the Bankruptcy Code emit certain conflicting incentive signals. One can,
of course, often criticize a body of law on the ground that its incentives to
private actors may flout that same law's underlying legislative or doctrinal
goals. For example, it has been contended that restriction on the rights of
secured parties in bankruptcy may induce secured parties to take even greater
security, thereby undermining the Bankruptcy Code's goal of expanding the
estate of the debtor for the benefit of unsecured creditors. 51 But the
phenomenon of conflicting incentive signals occurs when the incentives
created by one body of law are at cross purposes with the incentives created
by another.
That article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code emit conflicting incentive signals
should hardly surprise us. The overriding thrust of article 9 has been to
protect security interests against various attacks that historically have been
mounted against them. A major thrust of the Bankruptcy Code and its
predecessors, on the other hand, has been to enhance the debtor's estate for
the benefit of unsecured creditors by, among other things, empowering the
trustee to vitiate some of the defenses of the secured party. Some tension is
perhaps inevitable whenever the law implicates more than one interest, but
what aggravates the tension here is the failure effectively to compromise and
150. Otherwise we would have created the side effect of differentiating between a secured
creditor's rights in bankruptcy and those outside it. Without substantial cause for such
differentiation, this consequence is highly undesirable. See infra note 181.
151. See, e.g., White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor's Rights Through Cases, Rules and Statutory
Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Miss. L.J. 389, 426 (1983).
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to reconcile the respective competing interests in one statute. Hence, a clash
occurs, resulting in conflicting, or at least inconsistent, incentive signals.
Consider, for example, the incentive operating on creditors to allow the
debtor to retain use of his assets by permitting the creditor to file notice of his
claimed security interest in that property. Although article 9, as amended in
1972, seems to evince a general policy of indifference between filing a
financing statement and taking possession of the collateral as alternative
means of perfecting a security interest, arguably some preference for filing is
exhibited.' 5 2 The rationale supporting this preference seems to lie in its
facilitation of a functional division of the uses in property: The debtor gets
the present productive use, while the secured party gets an interest to secure
an obligation. True, the secured party's interest may be converted into a
possessory use, but usually only upon the debtor's default.
Ostensibly, the Bankruptcy Code serves the same objectives: Section 362
automatically stays any attempt by secured creditors to seize their
collateral, 153 and section 542 empowers the trustee to collect all the debtor's
property for the benefit of the bankrupt's estate. 154 Moreover, the Supreme
Court in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. 155 has certainly strengthened the
trustee's hand to force a turnover. But a careful reading ofJustice Blackmun's
opinion in Whiting Pools reveals that the holding was explicitly confined to
property that had been seized by the creditor as a remedy-the Court did
"not decide whether any property of the debtor in which a third party holds a
possessory interest independent of a creditor's remedies is subject to turnover
under sec. 542(a)." 56 Continuing, Justice Blackmun noted that "if property
is pledged to the secured creditor so that the creditor has possession prior to
any default, sec. 542(a) may not require turnover."' 57 Indeed, I have been
able to find no reported instance in which a secured party, having perfected its
security interest by possession-for example, a brokerage firm with
possession of the investment securities that secure the margin credit extended
to the debtor-investor-was required to turn over the pledged collateral to
the bankrupt estate. What is true for securities might well hold true for other
types of assets.
In short, then, article 9 appears generally to favor the filed security interest
over the possessory security interest-in that it supplies the secured party
with an incentive to file and to leave the debtor in possession of his property.
The Bankruptcy Code, as amended, however, may well be supplying the
opposite incentive, because of the possibly untoward consequences to the
secured party of allowing the debtor to remain in possession of his property.
152. See UCC § 9-312(5)(a). The secured party who files first will win the priority conflict whether
or not he first gives value to the debtor, but the secured party who first takes possession without
giving value will lose out to the secured party who files first.
153. Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(3) & (4).
154. Id. § 542(a).
155. 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
156. Id. at 207-08 n.14.
157. Id.
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And where the debtor needs possession, there seems to be a tendency to
structure the transaction so as to accord the debtor neither a legal nor
arguably even an equitable title in the property. For example, some lawyers
who advise equipment suppliers or financiers are counseling their clients to
cast their dealings in the form of equipment leases rather than conditional
sales. 158
C. Imperfect Docking
Even when we cannot conclude that the incentives created by the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code clearly conflict, another related
phenomenon may be seen-a relational dynamic that I term "imperfect
docking." Imperfect docking occurs when groups of statutory draftsmen,
each aware of the work of the other and genuinely trying to coordinate their
efforts, fail squarely to connect, and the misfit between the two statutes then
exceeds the tolerance that is normally exhibited between two interrelated
sections of the same legislation.
The drafters of article 9 and the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code that ratified the 1972 amendments were, of course, aware
of the Bankruptcy Act. Similarly, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States, whose preliminary efforts foreshadowed much of the
substance of the Bankruptcy Code, and those others who ultimately drafted
the Code were aware of article 9 and its relevance to the law of bankruptcy.
Moreover, although certain sections of article 9-sections 9-108' 59 and 9-
205t 60-may be read as a repudiation of then-existing bankruptcy law, article
9, by and large, echoed the Bankruptcy Act's policies and goals, including an
abhorrence of both secret liens' 6 ' and of any realignment of the debtor's
assets on the eve of bankruptcy in order to favor certain creditors.' 62 The
Bankruptcy Code similarly was harmonized with the policies and goals of
article 9 by protecting, among other things, floating liens, 163 purchase money
158. See, e.g., Koch, Bankrupcy Planningfor the Secured Lender, 99 BANKING L.J. 788, 790-92 (1982).
Mr. Koch also advises that financiers take accounts and chattel paper in outright purchase
transactions rather than as security for a loan to avoid its possible characterization as property of the
debtor's estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The importance of differentiating
between security and purchase transactions in accounts and chattel paper for purposes of bankruptcy
law, however, runs counter to one of the stated rationales for including both types of transactions
within article 9. See UCC § 9-102.
159. The openly acknowledged purpose of section 9-108 was to save the floating lien from
invalidation as a preferential transfer under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
160. Section 9-205, which allows the debtor to commingle or dispose of collateral or proceeds
without invalidating the security interest, was meant to overrule Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925), which, although nominally an interpretation of state law, had a powerful impact on the rights
of secured parties in bankruptcy proceedings.
161. The need to perfect the security interest, in most circumstances by filing a financing
statement or taking possession of collateral so that others are put on notice of the secured party's
interest, itself constitutes a strong statement against secret liens.
162. It is significant that UCC § 9-108 only seeks to validate the floating lien where the debtor
acquires the collateral "in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of purchase made
pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after new value is given."
163. See Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(5).
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security interests,' 64 and the perfected security interest against attack by the
trustee as either a hypothetical 65 or an actual creditor. 66 Nonetheless, the
extent of the accommodation between these bodies of law and the
commonality of their generalized goals should not blind us to the degree to
which imperfect docking occurred. Consider two examples: first, the
protection afforded to purchase money security interests; and, second, the
unending labyrinth of section 9-306(4)(d), 167 which seeks to define the extent
of the secured party's interest in commingled bank accounts-that is, bank
accounts in which both proceeds of the collateral and other monies have been
deposited-upon the insolvency of the debtor.
Article 9 sharply differentiates between the purchase money secured party
and the nonpurchase money secured party 68 and generally grants the former
a period of ten days after delivery of the goods within which to file a financing
statement. 69 The rationale for this distinction is simply an unwillingness to
impede the sale of goods on a purchase money credit basis by requiring the
withholding of delivery pending filing in the absence of a serious risk that
others will mistakenly and detrimentally rely upon the buyer's apparent
ownership of the goods free of any security interest. The same consideration
does not obtain in the nonpurchase money situation, so no delay in filing is
sanctioned. Yet, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, for purposes of
protecting a security interest against avoidance by the trustee as a preference,
regards a transfer to have been made "at the time such transfer takes effect
between the transferor [in article 9 terminology, the debtor] and the
transferee [in article 9 terminology, the secured party], if such transfer is
perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time."' 70 In other words, in the
bankruptcy context, the ten-day grace period applies to the perfection of all-
not simply purchase money-security interests. It is unclear why the
Bankruptcy Code should protect a tardily perfected security interest in a
164. See id. § 547(c)(3).
165. See id. § 544(a)(1).
166. Id. § 544(b).
167. UCC § 9-306(4)(d) reads:
In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured party with
a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security interest only in the following
proceeds: .. .(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been
commingled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is...
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the
debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings less the sum of (I) the
payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by the debtor during such
period and (II) the cash proceeds received by the debtor during such period to which the
secured party is entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this subsection (4).
168. UCC § 9-107 defines purchase money security interests as those "(a) taken or retained by
the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making
advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used."
169. See UCC §§ 9-301(2) (protection against lien creditors); 9-312(4) (protection against secured
parties if collateral is other than inventory). But see § 9-312(3) (protection against prior secured
parties if collateral is inventory only if filing is made before inventory is delivered to the debtor).
170. Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)(2).
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situation where article 9 would not. Rather than the result of deliberate
design, my suspicion is that this is an instance of imperfect docking.' 7 '
Another, more serious example of imperfect docking relates to the extent
to which the secured party is recognized as having a perfected security interest
in proceeds in the event of the debtor's insolvency. Here, article 9's drafters
came to the problem later, and it is they who sought to effect a rendezvous
with the federal law of bankruptcy. In the 1962 version of section 9-306(4) of
the Uniform Commercial Code, the docking was barely visible. The drafters
of the UCC were aware of the state-created priority and the statutory lien
arguments that had been directed at the model for that provision, section 10
of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. 172 Nevertheless, they chose to run the
preemption risk because they believed that a trade-off between the limitations
on the rights of the secured party to reach proceeds and his recourse to the
funds of the debtor without the necessity of tracing them was both feasible
and fair. 173 Their view of the debtor's assets as an aggregate mass was also
reflected in their concept of the floating lien and the notice-filing system that
did not require exact identification of collateral.' 74
In the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial Code, the docking was
more deliberate. The secured party became entitled only to funds in those
commingled bank accounts in which proceeds had been deposited. 175 And
case law began to impose further limitations: Where proceeds were
commingled with other deposited funds, the secured party would have a right
only to those that he could have claimed apart from the bankruptcy
proceeding.' 76 The net result has been highly paradoxical. By virtue of the
present phraseology and interpretation of section 9-306(4), then, the secured
party now receives less in the aggregate than he would have received outside
171. For a thorough treatment of the disparate treatment of delayed perfection under article 9 of
the UCC and under the Bankruptcy Code, see Dawson, An Uneasy Relationship Between the Bankruptcy
Reform Act and the Uniform Commercial Code: Delayed and Continued Perfection of Security Interests, 36 U. FLA.
L. REV. 38 (1983).
172. See In re Harpeth Motors, Inc. 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955); In re Crosstown Motors,
Inc., 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960).
173. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.9, at 1340 (1965). The
1962 version of UCC § 9-306(4)(d) allowed the secured party to reach the debtor's bank accounts,
regardless of whether proceeds had been deposited in the accounts, if proceeds had been deposited
in any commingled account.
174. UCC § 9-402(1) only requires that the financing statement indicate "the types . . . of
collateral." See Comment 2, UCC § 9-402.
175. See UCC § 9-306(4)(d).
176. See, e.g., In re Gibson Products of Arizona, 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
946 (1977); In re Guaranteed Muffler Supply Company, Inc., 5 Bankr. 236 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
The court in the latter case stated:
[Section 9-306(2)] makes proceeds claims, by definition, depend upon a showing that the
property claimed is identified as the fruit of a sale or other disposition of the original collateral.
Thus, a right to proceeds of any kind, whether in bankruptcy or not, arises out of the language of
section 9-306(2); the limitations upon "cash proceeds" listed in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) therefore,
include, by definition, the identifiability limitations which apply to all claims made to all
proceeds. To require that proceeds claims be so limited is consistent with the fact that the
exercise of lien rights is confined to specific property which the debtor has chosen to make
available as a surrogate for his own performance.
Id. at 238-39.
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bankruptcy. 177 And because the secured party receives nothing in bankruptcy
to which he would not otherwise be entitled, no transactions costs are saved
by using the subsection's formula rather than an explicit tracing approach to
proceeds. 178
In still another body of case law, courts have sought to coordinate section
9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code with section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code179 -and again, the result can only be deemed imperfect. In
these cases, prebankruptcy transfers of funds to the secured party have been
invalidated as preferential without regard to whether the payment reduced
the secured debt or the secured party was overcollateralized.180 Courts have
reasoned that if, when bankruptcy ensues, section 9-306(4)(d) would not
entitle the secured party to reach funds remaining in the debtor's commingled
bank account, payment from such an account to the secured party is a
preferential transfer under section 547 of the Code. As so used, in
conjunction with section 547, section 9-306(4)(d) has become a weapon to
attack the secured party with respect to payments made not simply within ten
days of bankruptcy, but anytime within three months of bankruptcy.
No matter how erroneous, this judicial linkage of section 9-306(4)(d) of
the Uniform Commercial Code and section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code may
be justified by the need to obviate any distinction between the right of the
secured party to take action inside and outside bankruptcy. Otherwise, parties
would be encouraged to act in these matters on the basis of legal rather than
business necessity. But while this judicial linkage may marginally reduce the
incentive of the secured party to demand payment on the eve of bankruptcy, it
creates inappropriate incentives to action by other parties. Clearly, a
transformation of the debtor's assets from collateral such as inventory, chattel
paper, or accounts into cash, particularly on the eve of bankruptcy, changes
the relative entitlements between and among the secured and other parties.
Consequently, other parties and sometimes the debtor, depending upon his
177. See, e.g., In re Cooper, 2 B.R. 188, 196 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (formula in § 9-306(4)(d) interpreted
as "in lieu of the right to trace and [in limitation of] any right the secured creditor would have had in
non-Code situations to trace proceeds by any means available").
178. As interpreted, UCC § 9-306(4)(d) has not eased the problems of proof and of
decisionmaking with respect to claims to proceeds by secured parties. See, e.g., In re Conklin, 14 B.R.
318 (D.S.C. 1981). There, after the debtor had filed a chapter 11 petition on December 14, 1979, the
case was converted to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding on April 1, 1980. Because the trustee had
contested only the date from which the ten-day period should run under § 9-306(4)(d)-arguing that
it should be April 1-the secured parties had addressed that point alone and had presented no proof
as to commingled funds in the debtor's bank account prior to December 14. Although the court
determined that December 14 was the crucial date for purposes of § 9-306(4)(d), it nonetheless held
that the secured parties were not entitled to the proceeds owing to the absence of such proof.
179. See, e.g., In rejameson's Foods, 35 B.R. 433 (D.S.C. 1983) (funds remitted to secured party
approximately two months before filing of petition); Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d
1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (payments made to secured party within ten days of bankruptcy).
180. But see In re Lackow Brothers, 19 B.R. 601 (Fla. 1981), where the court distinguished
between situations in which a secured party is undersecured (the debt exceeds the value of collateral)
and situations in which the secured party is fully secured or oversecured (the value of collateral
exceeds the debt). In the latter instance, the court held that any payments made by the debtor to the
secured party within 90 days of bankruptcy are not recoverable as a preferential transfer.
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relationship with the secured party, may be encouraged to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings to enhance their relative shares.' 8 '
In short, there is simply no reason for the Uniform Commercial Code to
limit the secured party's right to proceeds in the event of insolvency, as the
law, both statutory and decisional, seems currently to dictate. There is no
legitimate trade-off, and imperfect docking in this context has created
incentives that are insupportable, whether one addresses the problem from
the perspective of the secured party or that of the debtor and his estate.
D. Direct Confrontation of Policy Issues
The phenomena of conflicting incentive signals and imperfect docking
evince a more fundamental reason for integrating bankruptcy and personal
property security law: the difficulty of identifying and resolving policy issues
when the policymaker confronts only part of the subject matter involved. And
the literature and decisional law in this area suggest a whole range of policy
issues that merit serious review. These include: What is the aggregate benefit
to be derived from security interests-with the possible conclusion that such
an institution is unjustifiable? Should any security interest, no matter how
broadly articulated, be capable of covering more than a certain percentage of
the debtor's property? Has the Bankruptcy Code conduced to bankruptcy
where it could have been avoided by altering the rights of the parties outside
bankruptcy? 8 2 To what extent should the validity of floating liens be
dependent upon either the nature of the collateral-whether inventory,
accounts, chattel paper, or instruments-or a comparison of the value of the
collateral on the date of bankruptcy and its value on an earlier date? 83
Should enforcement of security interests be subject to stays in bankruptcy;
and, if so, what constitutes adequate protection for the secured party? 8 4
181. Professor Jackson has persuasively argued that bankruptcy law should "mirror the
agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they able to negotiate
such an agreement from an ex ante position." Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982). Characterizing this as the "creditors' bargain,"
Professor Jackson views a reduction of strategic costs as an important if not essential aspect of
maintaining the creditors' bargain. See id. at 861-64. See also Baird &Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations
and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 101 (1984) (arguing that "protecting the value of a secured
creditor's nonbankruptcy rights-whatever they might be-actually reinforces the bankruptcy policy
of putting the firm's assets to their best use by placing the costs of trying to keep the assets of a firm
together on those who stand to benefit from such an effort," and that if parties other than secured
parties "do not bear these costs, they will have an incentive to place a firm in bankruptcy and to draw
out the proceeding, even though doing so does not work to the advantage of those with rights to the
firm's assets when their interests are considered as a group").
182. See Jackson, supra note 181; Baird &Jackson, supra note 181.
183. The calculation required by section 547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code (the trustee's power
to avoid preferential transfers) as to the value of inventory and receivables 90 days before the
bankruptcy petition is filed and the equivalent figure on the date of filing does not seem generally to
have impacted the rights of secured parties adversely. See Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code upon Secured and Unsecured Creditors, 69 MINN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
184. See Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Models of Fairness, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1983) (arguing that the fifth amendment poses no obstacles to changing the creditors'
bargain).
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Does equity require that secured parties receive a senior class of securities in
bankruptcy reorganizations? 185 Should secured parties enjoy lesser rights
upon the debtor's bankruptcy than do other lien holders; and, if so, why? 186
And should the scope of both after-acquired property and future advance
clauses be curbed more than it has been under the 1962 and 1972 versions of
article 9?
Such policy issues are not easy to resolve, and the answers of one
generation may not seem appropriate to another. My point is simply that one
is less likely to achieve adequate resolution-or even identification and
discussion-of these issues if the policymaker's concern is definitionally
confined to only part of the law integrally related to these issues.
IV
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that the subject matter of article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, security interests in personal property, should be
federalized and integrated with the Bankruptcy Code, although the substance
of that law would obviously extend beyond the bankruptcy context. The
arguments for federalization seem persuasive enough. These arguments
include true uniformity of the law of secured transactions throughout the
United States, the prospect of a more sensible national filing system, and the
greater authority that a federalized law would carry. The dynamics between
the Uniform Commercial Code and federal bankruptcy law, with at least two
versions of article 9 and two different bankruptcy statutes under our belts of
recent experience, including the conflicting signals and imperfect docking
phenomena, reinforce the federalization idea.
Some would observe that my suggestion, while meritorious, is not as
immediately urgent as are other legislative proposals related to bankruptcy.
To this observation, I do not strongly object. On the other hand, however,
deferring remedial legislation until the problem assumes crisis or near-crisis
proportions carries the risk that much of the subject matter of article 9 may be
federalized without the rationality entailed by the proposal that it be
integrated with the Bankruptcy Code. Most tellingly, Congress recently
included in the Food Security Act a provision that would protect the
185. See Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527
(1983). Professor Roe proposes that only common equity interests be issued in bankrupty
reorganization when the debtor is recapitalized, arguing that neither equitable nor other factors
require the issuance of senior securities, even to secured parties.
186. In In re Filterer Engineering Associates, 27 B.R. 878 (E.D.Mich. 1983), the question was
whether a debtor in possession under chapter 11 could reject a contract that required a percentage of
payments made under another contract to be remitted to Filterer Engineering Associates' attorneys.
The attorneys had negotiated the contract in settlement of a patent dispute under which one-third of
the payments in settlement would be made to the law firm. The court held the law firm to be entitled
to the payments but said that if these had been accounts in which a secured party held a security
interest, the attorneys would not have been so favored under section 547(c). One of the distinctions
the court drew was between security interests and other liens; in the court's judgment, the attorneys
had a lien, even if that lien was reflected in a contract that assigned the sums involved.
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purchasers of farm products from security interests created by farmers,
despite the explicit exclusion of persons "buying farm products from a person
engaged in farming operations" from the classes of favored parties protected
by section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. 187 Although few
would argue with the finding included in section 1324 of the Food Security
Act that the present posture of the law "exposes purchasers of farm products
to double payment" and, therefore, "constitutes a burden on and an
obstruction to interstate commerce in farm products,"' 88 this mode of
amending article 9 only exacerbates the problems of imperfect docking
between federal and state law and the conflicting incentive signals the two
bodies emit.
Indeed, perhaps all of commercial law currently covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code merits federalization 89 I do not exclude that possibility.
If so, federalizing personal property security law could also be commended as
an experimental first step in that direction.
187. Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1324, 99 Stat. 1535 (1985). By excluding the purchasers of farm
products from the protection offered by § 9-307(1), the UCC effectively protects the secured party at
the expense of the buyer of farm products unless the disposition of the farm products free of the
security interest "was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise." UCC
§ 9-306(2). Courts, however, have tended broadly to interpret the circumstances when authority has
been given using the "or otherwise" phrase. See, e.g., Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554,
425 P.2d 726 (1967) (court interpreting past practices as signifying such authority despite explicit
provision in security agreement to the contrary). The Food Security Act strikes a different balance
between secured creditors and buyers by imposing a filing requirement for both sets of parties. If
they both comply, the buyer will have specific notice of the security interest but will, nonetheless,
take free of it after having insured compliance with "any payment obligations imposed on the buyer
by the secured party as conditions for waiver or release of the security interest." Pub. L. No. 99-198,
§ 1324d(d)(5). If either the secured party or the purchaser fails to comply, so that notice of the
security interest is not given, any loss owing to a failure of the buyer to comply withthe terms of the
security agreement will fall on the party who failed to file and thereby frustrated the specific notice
scheme.
188. § 1324(a)(1).
189. Cf Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1985) (arguing
that different product quality legislation has amounted to a subsidy flowing from those persons who
reside in less protective states to those who reside in more protective states). While Professor Rice
does not extend his analysis to a normative resolution, see id. at 60-64, he impliedly suggests that the
part of article 2 of the UCC that deals with warranty questions might merit a federal rather than a
state-by-state approach.
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